Altnet PIA: the Framework, the Coalition and TAR 2026-31
In short: Altnet PIA, the Openreach product that lets operators build using its ducts and poles, is not new. It has been a regulated wholesale input since 2010, and the Electronic Communications Code requires operators to consider sharing apparatus more broadly. Two recent moves progress those arrangements. INCA’s Infrastructure Sharing Framework formalises operator-to-operator duct, pole and dark fibre arrangements. The PIA Coalition is pressing Ofcom for cheaper altnet PIA pricing. Both reduce capital intensity for fibre build.
Altnet PIA, the Openreach wholesale product that lets operators build using its ducts and poles, is not new. Physical infrastructure access has been a regulated wholesale input from Openreach since 2010, and the Electronic Communications Code has long required operators to consider sharing apparatus more broadly. Two recent moves progress those existing arrangements. INCA’s Infrastructure Sharing Framework, launched in October 2025, formalises ad-hoc operator-to-operator duct, pole and dark fibre arrangements across more than 20 altnets and an estimated 500,000 km of spare capacity, with the £100 million mobile backhaul market the principal target. Separately, a group of five altnets representing more than five million premises ready for service has formed the PIA Coalition and filed a TAR consultation response asking Ofcom to lower the price Openreach charges third parties for it. The Framework is a marketplace formalising the non-regulated route; the Coalition is a submission pushing for better regulated infrastructure access. The unifying logic is capital intensity: both reduce the cost of fibre build, and both bear on the unhappy path the consolidation wave has put in front of lenders and PE backers.
Regulatory background: altnet PIA, TAR 2026-31 and the Code
Ofcom published the Telecoms Access Review 2026-31 on 17 March 2026. The conditions take effect on 1 April 2026 and run to 31 March 2031. Ofcom found Openreach to hold significant market power in physical infrastructure access (PIA), wholesale local access and very high capacity network services, and imposed access conditions under section 87 of the Communications Act 2003: network access on fair and reasonable terms, no undue discrimination, cost orientation, transparency and quality of service. The remedy survives in substantially the same form. The one material change is a new explicit margin squeeze test on Openreach’s FTTP wholesale prices, requiring the price Openreach charges for FTTP wholesale to leave a sufficient margin above the wholesale price third-party access seekers pay for duct and pole access.
The regulated access regime sits alongside the Electronic Communications Code in Schedule 3A to the Communications Act 2003 (inserted by Schedule 1 to the Digital Economy Act 2017 and amended by the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022). Code rights are conferred by an occupier or owner of land on an operator and govern the installation, operation and maintenance of apparatus on, over or under that land, together with statutory rights to upgrade or share that apparatus with other operators. The upgrade and share dimension is where operator-to-operator arrangements have their statutory footing vis-à-vis the underlying landowner.
Operator infrastructure sharing under the Framework
Operator infrastructure sharing under the Infrastructure Sharing Framework runs as a marketplace administered through INCA. Asset owners and asset seekers register with the trade body, with mapping support delivered through INCA’s partnership with AssetHub. The Framework provides common standard product definitions, terms and conditions, and template commercial documents covering operator-owned ducts, poles and dark fibre. Stated targets are operator-to-operator capacity, mobile backhaul, datacentre interconnect and tier-one carrier traffic. INCA estimates 500,000 km of spare member fibre is available, and identifies the £100 million mobile backhaul market as the principal commercial opportunity.
Competition law: Chapter I, not market power
The competition law questions raised by the Framework are about coordination, not dominance. None of the participants individually has the market footprint that would attract a market review under section 78 of the Communications Act 2003, and Ofcom has not historically used s 78 to designate altnet markets. A market review is not the lens.
The relevant test is the Chapter I prohibition under section 2 of the Competition Act 1998: agreements between undertakings that prevent, restrict or distort competition appreciably are void, subject to individual exemption under section 9. A platform that allows competing operators to exchange information about prices, capacity, future build plans or commercial strategy creates information-exchange risk, and the Framework’s documentation, governance and meeting hygiene have to be designed to keep that risk down. INCA’s public materials describe the Framework as covering common standard product definitions, template terms and conditions and template commercial documents, with sharing on a voluntary basis and detailed documents shared with registered participants. INCA has stated an ambition to develop a charter in due course; the conduct rules and operational governance therefore sit, for now, in materials that are not in the public domain.
The bilateral transactions between asset owners and asset seekers under the Framework are ordinary capacity contracts. They are analysed under Chapter I in the same way as any other horizontal arrangement: relevant market shares in the geographic area affected, the categories of information actually exchanged, restrictions on independent commercial behaviour, and the section 9 exemption arguments where they apply. Standard joint-venture and capacity-allocation analysis applies, not a sector-specific regulatory test. UK merger control engages only if the parties create a full-function joint-venture vehicle, which is not the structure described publicly. The competition-law adequacy of the bilateral arrangements turns on the specifics that sit inside the participant-only documents and the governance of the Infrastructure Sharing Special Interest Group through which the Framework is administered.
Code rights and the wayleave perimeter
The technical threshold sits with the underlying occupier or owner of the land that hosts the relevant apparatus. Code rights are statutory rights conferred on an operator by an occupier (or, where agreement cannot be reached, imposed by the Tribunal). Allowing one operator to use another operator’s duct, pole or dark fibre installed on that land is an upgrade and share right under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3A, exercisable as against the occupier without further consent, but only where the paragraph 17 conditions are met (no more than minimal adverse impact on appearance, no additional burden on the occupier). Where those conditions are not satisfied, the existing wayleave with the landowner needs to be amended or, in some cases, a fresh agreement reached. That is straightforward in routine cases and contentious in others.
The PIA Coalition and altnet PIA pricing
The second track is the Coalition’s regulatory campaign. The Coalition’s TAR consultation response argues that Openreach’s wholesale charges leave third-party access seekers paying materially more for duct and pole access than Openreach charges itself in equivalent transactions, and asks Ofcom to address that pricing gap. The final TAR statement does not accept the Coalition’s full case but does formalise the FTTP margin squeeze test, and Ofcom committed in the same statement to closer scrutiny of Openreach’s conduct and performance on physical infrastructure access through increased engagement and formal intervention. That is a meaningful but partial concession. The Coalition’s headline pricing argument now sits as a case for the next access review.
Commercial implications: altnet PIA and the Framework
For operators, altnet PIA stays the dominant input cost while the Framework opens a new revenue line by turning spare capacity into traffic without further build cost. The mobile backhaul opportunity is the most immediate commercial target, as MNOs continue to densify and look for alternatives to Openreach Ethernet circuits. Datacentre and hyperscaler connectivity is a slower but larger prize. The diligence required before committing capacity covers the relevant Code agreements (to confirm the upgrade and use rights), existing wholesale agreements (for change-of-use restrictions) and obligations under Ofcom’s General Conditions of Entitlement where the Framework introduces new traffic types.
For acquirers diligencing a PIA-dependent fibre target, our regulatory due diligence page sets out how we approach the work, covering Code agreements, PIA spend and Openreach disputes, Framework participation and counterparty bilaterals, and any margin-squeeze exposure under the new TAR test. The CMA’s pending fibre M&A workload, anchored on the local market definition question and the wider altnet consolidation wave, will sit in parallel with that diligence.
Viewpoint
Ofcom’s role here is narrower than the headlines suggest. The TAR 2026-31 framework was settled in March; the final statement made the strategic choice to keep PIA cost-based and retain the pro-investment FTTP regime. Altnet PIA falls inside Ofcom’s SMP toolkit; the Framework sits outside it. The competition law analysis on the Framework is conventional Chapter I work for the participants and their advisers, not new ground for Ofcom.
Both moves reduce capital intensity. The Framework converts under-utilised operator assets into revenue; the Coalition seeks to lower a key input cost for new build. Either narrows the gap between the happy and unhappy path the consolidation wave has put in front of lenders and PE backers.
For advice on cross-operator arrangements, Code agreements and altnet regulatory due diligence, contact Rob Bratby at Bratby Law. Bratby Law advises altnets, MNOs, lenders and PE investors on telecoms regulation.
