Cyber resilience guidance: what GC26/9 means for payment and e-money firms

Bratby Law Payments Regulation header card reading Cyber resilience guidance for payment firms, FCA, PRA and Bank of England GC26/9, closes 26 February 2027

In short: The Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England have published draft cyber resilience guidance for consultation (GC26/9), and responses close on 26 February 2027. If adopted, it would add no new rules, but the regulators would use it, with the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework as a key benchmark, to supervise payment and e-money firms’ existing duties under SYSC 15A and regulation 98 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017.

By Rob Bratby, Managing Partner, Bratby Law. 30+ years in regulated industries, including current Fractional General Counsel to UKPI. Chambers UK Band 2 (Telecommunications).

The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Bank of England have put draft cyber resilience guidance out for consultation. It is a proposal, and responses close on 26 February 2027. If it is adopted, the regulators would supervise payment and e-money institutions against expectations in six technical chapters, from board governance to recovery, and would use the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Cyber Assessment Framework as a key benchmark. The FCA reported that firms notified it of more cyber incidents in October 2026 than in any month for 18 months.

Key points

  • The FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England published the draft cyber risk and resilience guidance for consultation on 19 November 2026. Responses close on 26 February 2027, and the FCA plans to publish final guidance in the first half of 2027. Source: FCA GC26/9
  • The draft would add no new rules. The regulators would use it to supervise and enforce existing rules on operational resilience, operational risk and third-party risk management, listed in its Annex 2. Source: GC26/9, draft supervisory statement and guidance, paragraph 2.1
  • SYSC 15A applies to payment institutions, e-money institutions and registered account information service providers, so the draft would cover them. Source: SYSC 15A.1.1R; GC26/9, draft paragraph 1.9
  • All firms in scope would be expected to refer to the outcomes, objectives and indicators of the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework, which the regulators would use as a key benchmark in supervision. Source: GC26/9, draft paragraph 1.14
  • The central estimate of the cost of the proposals to FCA solo-regulated firms in scope is £7.8 million one-off and £1.7 million a year. Source: GC26/9, consultation paper paragraph 4.36

The cyber duties payment and e-money firms already have

Every payment service provider must establish a framework with appropriate mitigation measures and control mechanisms to manage the operational and security risks relating to its payment services, under regulation 98(1) of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs 2017). The framework must include incident management procedures for detecting and classifying major operational and security incidents. Regulation 98(2) and (3) require the provider to give the FCA an updated and comprehensive assessment of those risks, and of the adequacy of its controls, every year or more often if the FCA directs. Payment service providers include authorised and small payment institutions, account information service providers and e-money institutions.

The FCA’s operational resilience rules in SYSC 15A apply to e-money institutions, payment institutions and registered account information service providers (SYSC 15A.1.1R(3)), in relation to their payment services and e-money issuance. In the FCA Glossary both institution types include the small, registered categories. Each firm must identify its important business services (SYSC 15A.2.1R), set an impact tolerance for each, and be able to stay within it in a severe but plausible scenario. A payment service provider must notify the FCA of a major operational or security incident without undue delay under regulation 99(1), and Principle 11 requires it to tell the FCA of anything of which the FCA would reasonably expect notice.

What a firm would be expected to do under the draft cyber resilience guidance

The draft guidance concerns how those duties apply when the risk is cyber. Its expectations fall into six technical chapters: governance, identification and assessment, protection, detection, response and recovery, and assurance. Annex 2 lists the existing requirements to which they relate, including the Principles, SYSC 15A and regulation 98 of the PSRs 2017.

The board would approve and oversee the cyber strategy (paragraph 3.2), and a firm would avoid relying too much on a single specialist for cyber knowledge (paragraph 3.7). A firm would keep an up-to-date inventory of its assets and map its third-party dependencies (paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3), assume that a cyber incident will disrupt it (paragraph 7.2) and keep a documented response and recovery plan (paragraph 7.6). It would also develop proportionate capabilities to restore its important business services within impact tolerances, for example from trusted and immutable backups or by rebuilding systems from bare hardware, and demonstrate them to its board and the regulators (paragraph 7.31). Response and recovery testing would go beyond tabletop exercises where proportionate (paragraph 8.11). Smaller, less complex firms could take a proportionate approach to expectations that would need resources “beyond their reasonable capabilities” (paragraph 1.13).

What a payment firm must doWhere the duty comes fromWhat the regulators would expect of the firm
Manage operational and security risksPSRs 2017 regulation 98(1)Six technical chapters of expectations, with the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework as a key benchmark (paragraph 1.14)
Assess those risks for the FCA each yearPSRs 2017 regulation 98(2) and (3)Board management information that separates current, planned and validated capability (paragraph 3.15)
Stay within impact tolerances in severe but plausible scenariosSYSC 15ADisruption caused by cyber risks assessed against important business services (paragraph 2.3); capabilities to restore them within impact tolerances (paragraph 7.31)
Name who is accountableFirm’s own governance arrangementsResponsibility for the cyber risk and resilience strategy assigned to an appropriate senior manager (paragraph 3.20)
Notify major incidentsPSRs 2017 regulation 99(1); in the form and timescale in SUP 15.18 from 18 March 2027A definition of major incident tied to SUP 15.18, the PRA Rulebook and Principle 11 (footnote 12)

Accountability outside the Senior Managers regime

A payment or e-money institution authorised or registered only under the PSRs 2017 or the Electronic Money Regulations 2011, without a Part 4A permission, is not within the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) and has no SMF24. Such a firm would be expected to assign responsibility for its cyber risk and resilience strategy to “an appropriate senior manager” (paragraph 3.20). For a firm within SM&CR, the Chief Operations Function (SMF24) would ordinarily have overall responsibility for the cyber strategy and for reporting on it to the board (paragraph 3.19).

Incident reporting and the 18 March 2027 rules

Regulation 99(1) of the PSRs 2017 remains a payment service provider’s legal duty to notify a major operational or security incident. From 18 March 2027 the provider must make that notification in the form, and within the four-hour timescale, set by the rules in PS26/2, which add SUP 15.18 to the Handbook. Under the draft guidance a cyber incident would be major if it is reportable under the PRA Rulebook or SUP 15.18 of the FCA Handbook, or if the regulators would expect notice of it under Principle 11 (footnote 12). Footnote 12 does not name regulation 99, but it covers those notifications through SUP 15.18. A firm that uses outsourced cloud or AI services is also subject to the outsourcing notification duties, and the critical third parties regime applies to its largest suppliers.

Viewpoint

Nikhil Rathi, the FCA’s Chief Executive, said that the regulators’ response “shouldn’t always be more rules”. I read the draft guidance as consistent with that. The change I see is in how the FCA would read a firm’s annual regulation 98 assessment and its SYSC 15A self-assessment, because the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework would give it a published benchmark to read them against (paragraph 1.14).

I read paragraph 1.13 as the provision that matters most to smaller payment and e-money firms. Question 4 of the consultation asks how proportionality should reflect size, business model, risk profile and systemic importance.

Frequently asked questions

Does the cyber resilience guidance apply to payment and e-money institutions?

Yes, if the regulators adopt it as drafted. GC26/9 is a consultation, so it has no effect yet. It would cover firms within SYSC 15A, which includes e-money institutions, payment institutions and registered account information service providers, including the small, registered categories. The regulators would use it to supervise and enforce existing duties, including those under SYSC 15A, regulation 98 of the PSRs 2017 and the Principles.

Do payment firms have to follow the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework?

The draft guidance would ask all firms in scope to refer to the Cyber Assessment Framework’s outcomes, objectives and indicators, and the regulators would use it as a key benchmark in supervision (draft paragraph 1.14). That is a supervisory expectation, and question 5 of the consultation asks whether firms agree with the approach.

Who is accountable for cyber risk in a payment institution?

Under the draft guidance the board would approve and oversee the cyber strategy (draft paragraph 3.2). A payment or e-money institution outside the Senior Managers and Certification Regime has no SMF24, so it would be expected to assign responsibility for its cyber risk and resilience strategy to an appropriate senior manager (draft paragraph 3.20).

When will the cyber resilience guidance take effect?

The guidance is a consultation draft and has no effect yet. Responses close on 26 February 2027 and the FCA plans to publish final guidance in the first half of 2027. The FCA’s operational incident reporting rules in SUP 15.18, which the draft would use to define a major incident, come into force on 18 March 2027.


For advice on cyber resilience, operational resilience and other payments product and scheme governance questions under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 and the FCA’s rules, contact Rob Bratby at Bratby Law.

This post was researched and drafted with the help of Claude, Anthropic’s AI model. Rob Bratby chose the topic and thesis, and reviewed and edited the final post. Rob takes full responsibility for its content.

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