The CMA may require a firm with strategic market status to change the shape of its business, not only how it behaves. A conduct requirement governs how a designated firm behaves; under a pro-competition intervention (PCI) the CMA may remedy the features of a market that restrict competition, and may require structural change. The power is in Part 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (the DMCC Act), which came into force on 1 January 2025, and has been exercisable since the first designations in October 2025.

The regulatory framework

Under section 46 of the DMCC Act the CMA may make a pro-competition intervention, but only against a firm that already holds strategic market status in a digital activity. The CMA makes the intervention to remedy an adverse effect on competition (AEC). A factor or combination of factors relating to a digital activity has an adverse effect on competition where it prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the relevant digital activity in the United Kingdom. The test covers structural features of a market, such as network effects, high switching costs or vertical integration, that cannot be traced to a single act of misconduct.

Before it may act, the CMA must complete an investigation. The CMA may open a pro-competition investigation where it has reasonable grounds to consider that an AEC may exist (section 47). It must then work through a defined process: an investigation notice (section 48), a nine-month investigation, mandatory public consultation on its proposed decision (section 49), and a decision notice by the end of that nine-month period (section 50), after which it has four months to make the intervention, extendable by up to two months for special reasons. This is materially slower than imposing a conduct requirement, which the CMA can do directly. Through a pro-competition order the CMA may impose remedies that a conduct requirement cannot, including structural change.

Remedies available under a pro-competition order

Under section 51 of the DMCC Act the CMA may impose the remedies available in a market investigation, which section 51 takes from the Enterprise Act 2002 with the public interest paragraphs disapplied. That means the CMA can impose behavioural prohibitions, affirmative obligations such as a duty to supply on specified terms or to separate functions, transparency duties, and structural remedies up to and including divestiture. Under section 51(3) the CMA may also impose requirements on a trial basis, including by requiring the firm to act differently for different users or customers, which gives it an empirical way to calibrate remedies in fast-moving markets. The same statute inserted a narrower trial power into the market investigation regime, at sections 161B to 161E of the Enterprise Act 2002 and in force since 1 January 2025, confined to remedies concerning the provision of information to consumers. The pro-competition trial power is the broader of the two.

Remedy type	What it does	Example
Behavioural	Prohibits conduct that harms competition	Ending discriminatory pricing or conditional supply
Affirmative	Requires the firm to act in a specified way	Supplying rivals to a defined standard; functional separation
Structural	Changes the shape of the business	Divestiture or transfer of assets or a business division
Access and data	Mandates interoperability or access to data	Opening an interface or providing data portability

How a PCI relates to conduct requirements and commitments

The CMA may use both powers at once. A designated firm may be subject to conduct requirements under section 19 while the CMA runs a pro-competition investigation under section 47. The CMA can also accept commitments from a designated firm under section 56, in place of or alongside a pro-competition order, where the commitment addresses an adverse effect on competition or a detrimental effect resulting from one. That power has not yet been used. The CMA has instead proceeded on commitments Apple and Google made to it voluntarily, published in final form on 1 April 2026, covering app review, app ranking and use of data, and in Apple’s case a process for developers to request interoperable access to features within its operating system. The CMA has said it will move to formal requirements if those commitments prove ineffective. As at 12 August 2026 the CMA had imposed three conduct requirements on Google’s general search services and had not issued a pro-competition investigation notice for any designation.

Why pro-competition interventions matter for your business

A pro-competition order may require a designated firm to sell part of its business, not only to change how it behaves. The CMA must weigh the countervailing benefits to users when it decides the form and content of any order, so a designated firm should put its evidence on scope, proportionality and those benefits during the consultation. For businesses that depend on a designated platform, the CMA may require interoperability, data portability or supply on specified terms, giving a smaller competitor or business user access that commercial negotiation has not delivered. The CMA’s work on access to the near-field communication chip on iOS is directly relevant to payments and fintech clients. It published a call for views on 30 June 2026, covering the technical method for access and the pricing of access, and expects to consult on measures in autumn 2026.

How we work

Bratby Law works with clients as direct legal advisors on a specific question, as specialist co-counsel alongside a competition or corporate team, and as fractional general counsel on a retained basis. Rob Bratby currently holds four fractional General Counsel appointments, at The One Touch Switching Company, TelXL, Core Communication and the UK Payments Initiative. Where an intervention touches the use of personal data, the data protection analysis runs alongside.

Frequently asked questions about pro-competition interventions

What is the difference between a conduct requirement and a pro-competition intervention?

A conduct requirement governs how a designated firm behaves and can be imposed directly after consultation. A pro-competition intervention remedies the features of a market that entrench a firm’s power, can require structural change, and needs a separate investigation. The PCI is the more powerful but slower instrument.

When can the CMA open a pro-competition investigation?

Only against a firm that already holds strategic market status, and only where the CMA has reasonable grounds under section 47 to consider that a factor or combination of factors may be having an adverse effect on competition in the designated digital activity. The investigation itself then runs to a statutory timetable.

Can a pro-competition order require a firm to sell part of its business?

Yes. Section 51 draws on the Enterprise Act 2002 remedies regime, which includes structural remedies such as divestiture. Structural remedies are the most intrusive option and the CMA must be satisfied they are proportionate to the adverse effect on competition it has found.

How long does a pro-competition intervention take?

Longer than a conduct requirement. The process runs from an investigation notice through a nine-month investigation and mandatory public consultation to a decision notice, after which the CMA has four months to make the intervention, extendable by up to two months for special reasons. Firms and affected businesses should plan for a process lasting many months.

Has the CMA used its pro-competition intervention power yet?

Not as at 12 August 2026. The CMA had imposed three conduct requirements on Google’s general search services and had proceeded on voluntary commitments from Apple and Google on their mobile platforms, but it had not issued a pro-competition investigation notice for any designation. On 30 June 2026 it published a call for views on access to the near-field communication chip on iOS, on which it expects to consult on measures in autumn 2026.

Related digital regulation pages

The other digital regulation pages on this site:

Digital Regulation
SMS Designation and Conduct Requirements
Concurrent Competition Powers
Market Investigations and Studies
Merger Control in Digital Markets
Competition Enforcement and Litigation
EU Digital Markets Act Compliance

Also see

The regime also engages Telecoms Regulation, Payments Regulation and Data Protection. Current developments are covered in Insights.