
Pro-Competition Interventions
Advice on the CMA’s structural remedy power over firms with strategic market status
A pro-competition intervention is the CMA’s most far-reaching tool over a firm with strategic market status. Where a conduct requirement governs how a designated firm behaves, a pro-competition intervention (PCI) addresses the underlying features of a market that hold competition back, and can require structural change. The power sits in Part 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (the DMCC Act) and has been available to the CMA since the regime began on 1 January 2025. We advise designated firms facing the prospect of a PCI, and businesses that stand to benefit from one, on how the power works and what remedies it can deliver.
The regulatory framework
The CMA’s pro-competition intervention power arises under section 46 of the DMCC Act and is available only against a firm that already holds strategic market status in a digital activity. A PCI aims to remedy an adverse effect on competition (AEC), defined as a factor or combination of factors that prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the relevant digital activity in the United Kingdom. That test is deliberately broad. It reaches structural features of a market, such as network effects, high switching costs or vertical integration, that cannot be traced to a single act of misconduct.
The power is investigation-led and procedurally demanding. The CMA may open a pro-competition investigation where it has reasonable grounds to consider that an AEC may exist (section 47). It must then work through a defined process: an investigation notice, a nine-month investigation, mandatory consultation on its proposed decision, and a decision notice, followed by an implementation period. This is materially slower than imposing a conduct requirement, which the Digital Markets Unit can do directly. The trade-off is reach: a PCI can do things a conduct requirement cannot.
What remedies can a pro-competition order impose?
A pro-competition order draws on the full toolkit of market investigation remedies, applied through section 51 of the DMCC Act, which cross-refers to the remedies regime in the Enterprise Act 2002. That means the CMA can impose behavioural prohibitions, affirmative obligations such as a duty to supply on specified terms or to separate functions, transparency duties, and structural remedies up to and including divestiture. A notable innovation, absent from the older market investigation regime, lets the CMA trial an intervention on a defined group of users or customers before applying it more widely, giving it an empirical way to calibrate remedies in fast-moving markets.
| Remedy type | What it does | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Behavioural | Prohibits conduct that harms competition | Ending discriminatory pricing or conditional supply |
| Affirmative | Requires the firm to act in a specified way | Supplying rivals to a defined standard; functional separation |
| Structural | Changes the shape of the business | Divestiture or transfer of assets or a business division |
| Access and data | Mandates interoperability or access to data | Opening an interface or providing data portability |
How does a PCI relate to conduct requirements and commitments?
The two enforcement tools operate side by side. A designated firm can face conduct requirements under section 19 and a pro-competition investigation under section 47 at the same time. The CMA can also accept commitments from a designated firm under section 56, in place of or alongside a pro-competition order. The commitments the CMA accepted from Apple and Google on mobile platforms in April 2026, covering interoperability and app-review, ranking and data practices, are the first use of that route. As at mid-2026 the CMA had imposed conduct requirements on Google Search and accepted mobile-platform commitments, but had not yet issued a pro-competition investigation notice for any designation.
Why pro-competition interventions matter for your business
For a designated firm, a PCI is the intervention with the greatest commercial consequence, because it can reshape the business rather than merely constrain its conduct. Early legal engagement on scope, proportionality and the countervailing benefits to users is essential, because the CMA must weigh those benefits when it decides the form and content of any order. For businesses that depend on a designated platform, a PCI can open access that commercial negotiation has failed to deliver: mandated interoperability, data portability or a duty to supply can change what is possible for a smaller competitor or business user. The CMA’s work on access to near-field communication for mobile payments is widely seen as the most likely early candidate for this power, which makes it directly relevant to payments and fintech clients.
How we work
We work with clients in three ways: as direct legal advisers on a specific question, as specialist co-counsel alongside a competition or corporate team, and as fractional general counsel on a retained basis. Rob Bratby currently holds four fractional General Counsel appointments, at The One Touch Switching Company, TelXL, Core Communication and the UK Payments Initiative, giving direct operator-side insight into how platform remedies affect businesses that rely on regulated infrastructure. Where an intervention touches the use of personal data, we address it through our data protection practice.
Need advice on a pro-competition intervention?
Frequently asked questions about pro-competition interventions
What is the difference between a conduct requirement and a pro-competition intervention?
A conduct requirement governs how a designated firm behaves and can be imposed directly after consultation. A pro-competition intervention remedies the features of a market that entrench a firm’s power, can require structural change, and needs a separate investigation. The PCI is the more powerful but slower instrument.
When can the CMA open a pro-competition investigation?
Only against a firm that already holds strategic market status, and only where the CMA has reasonable grounds under section 47 to consider that a factor or combination of factors may be having an adverse effect on competition in the designated digital activity. The investigation itself then runs to a statutory timetable.
Can a pro-competition order require a firm to sell part of its business?
Yes. Section 51 draws on the Enterprise Act 2002 remedies regime, which includes structural remedies such as divestiture. Structural remedies are the most intrusive option and the CMA must be satisfied they are proportionate to the adverse effect on competition it has found.
How long does a pro-competition intervention take?
Longer than a conduct requirement. The process runs from an investigation notice through a nine-month investigation and mandatory consultation to a decision notice, followed by an implementation period. Firms and affected businesses should plan for a process measured in many months, not weeks.
Has the CMA used its pro-competition intervention power yet?
Not as at mid-2026. The CMA had imposed conduct requirements on Google in search and accepted commitments from Apple and Google on mobile platforms, but it had not issued a pro-competition investigation notice for any designation. Work on access to near-field communication for mobile payments is widely regarded as the most likely early candidate for the power. Because a pro-competition intervention requires a separate investigation and can deliver structural remedies, its first use will be watched closely by designated firms and by the businesses that depend on them.
Also see
Explore our related Digital Regulation pages on SMS Designation and Conduct Requirements, EU Digital Markets Act Compliance, Market Investigations and Studies and Competition Enforcement and Litigation, or return to the Digital Regulation hub. The regime intersects with our work in Telecoms Regulation, Payments Regulation and Data Protection. For commentary on current developments, see our Insights.
